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Abstract This study aims to derive the epistemic bias in shi-bu-shi questions, a
type of A-not-A question formed with the focus marker shi. I propose: (i) the focus
marker shi presupposes that its prejacent is a possible complete answer to the cur-
rent Question Under Discussion (QUD); (ii) accordingly, shi-bu-shi questions are
presupposed to be part of the Focus-strategy of inquiry; (iii) the Focus-strategy of
inquiry indicates the questioner’s intention to close the current QUD, and to achieve
this goal, the questioner should check the answer that she considers most likely to
be true. By assuming such completeness-to-likelihood reasoning, a novel link be-
tween focus in polar questions and question bias is established. The ramifications
of this proposal for related phenomena (e.g., bias in embedded questions, evidential
bias) are then discussed.
Keywords: polar questions, focus, maximality presupposition, Question Under Discussion,
strategies of inquiry, question bias
1 Introduction
Mandarin Chinese features two types of A-not-A questions. Whereas V-neg-V
questions like (1) are used only in neutral contexts, shi-bu-shi questions like (2),
formed with the focus marker shi, are used only in biased contexts where the ques-
















‘Is it pragmatics that you like?’
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For instance, in (3), Zhangsan as the questioner lacks the knowledge of Lisi’s
research interests, and there is no clue in the context. To find out the addressee’s
research interests, the questioner can use V-neg-V questions but not shi-bu-shi ques-
tions. If the answer is yes, the addressee can respond by repeating the main verb of
the question, but not by confirmative particles dui/meicuo/shide (‘right’).1
(3) Neutral context: Zhangsan is interviewing Lisi, a student he knows nothing









‘Do you like pragmatics?’ ‘#Yes, you are right./Yes, I do.’
(4) illustrates a biased context in which public contextual evidence supports
the positive answer. Since the questioner Zhangsan does not ignore the positive
evidence (in the terminology of Sudo 2013), nor does he have prior beliefs, he will
infer that the positive answer is more likely to be true. In contrast to (3), while V-
neg-V questions are incompatible with the presence of positive evidence, shi-bu-shi
questions are felicitous in such contexts, and can be answered by dui/meicuo/shide.
(4) Biased context: Zhangsan is curious about Lisi’s research interests. In the











‘Is it pragmatics that you like?’ ‘Yes, you are right./#Yes, I do.’
Positive evidence in the current context is not the only way to make the ques-
tioner biased. (5) exemplifies another type of biased context. Based on the prior
hearsay, the questioner holds the private belief that the positive answer is more
likely to be true. Again, shi-bu-shi questions, rather than V-neg-V questions, can be
used in such contexts.
(5) Biased context: Zhangsan and Lisi are on the phone, and they are curious
about each other’s research interests. Zhangsan remembers someone telling
him that Lisi liked pragmatics.
1 I take these confirmative particles as an additional diagnosis of question bias, given that they are
used exclusively as responses to biased polar questions and assertions (see Guo 2000; Ye 2020a
for details). I have developed an analysis of the semantics of these confirmative particles, which
can be sketched as follows: (i) dui/meicuo/shide are remnants of the ellipsis of full clauses like ni
shuo de dui/meicuo/shide (‘what you said is right’); (ii) they are anaphoric to a unique propositional
discourse referent that calls for evaluation (cf. Krifka 2013); (iii) a propositional discourse referent
calls for evaluation if the proposition is in the projected common grounds (Farkas & Bruce 2010).
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‘Is it pragmatics that you like?’ ‘Yes, you are right./#Yes, I do.’
Both V-neg-V questions and shi-bu-shi questions are incompatible with the con-
textual evidence or the private belief that favors the negative answer. For instance,
(1) and (2) are infelicitous in the following contexts:
(6) Biased context: Zhangsan is interested in Lisi’s research interests. During
the interview, he finds that Lisi has never read Paul Grice.
(7) Biased context: Zhangsan and Lisi are on the phone, and they are curious
about each other’s research interests. Zhangsan remembers someone telling
him that Lisi did not like pragmatics.
To summarize, whereas V-neg-V questions can be characterized as anti-bias
questions (Yuan & Hara 2015), shi-bu-shi questions carry an epistemic bias towards
the positive answer.2 Such positive epistemic bias is puzzling given that A-not-
A questions present two answer options — {λw . p(w),λw .¬p(w)}— equally and











2 Note that the epistemic bias in shi-bu-shi questions is not a prior belief. As shown by (4) and (5),
shi-bu-shi questions express the questioner’s present conjecture, regardless of whether or not there
exists supporting evidence in the current context. Sudo’s (2013) division between evidential and
epistemic bias does not appear to be significant for contexts like (4), in which there is no prior belief
and the private belief is based on contextual evidence.
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Syntactically, the A-not-A form is generally assumed to be a morphological re-
alization of the head of the Polarity Phrase (PolP), which functions as the Hamblin
polar Q-operator taking a proposition and returning a set with the proposition and
its negation (cf. Huang 1991; Schaffar & Chen 2001). As sketched in the diagram
above, shi-bu-shi questions differ from V-neg-V questions in the locus of the Polar-
ity Phrase. Whereas V-neg-V is located inside the IP domain, shi-bu-shi, which is
formed by reduplicating the focus marker shi and inserting the negator bu, is out-
side the IP domain (see Schaffar & Chen 2001; Tsai & Yang 2015; Ye 2020a for
detailed evidence). It is uncontroversial that V-neg-V questions denote a size-two
set. In view of the monopolar IP of shi-bu-shi questions, however, one may specu-
late that shi-bu-shi is lexicalized as some kind of speech act operator and shi-bu-shi
questions denote a singleton set, which results in the epistemic bias. This possibility
is unlikely given embedded A-not-A questions.
























‘Zhangsan knows whether it is pragmatics that Lisi likes.’
When embedded by certain responsive predicates (Lahiri 2002), the difference
between V-neg-V questions and shi-bu-shi questions is insignificant, and the bias in
shi-bu-shi questions seems concealed.3 For instance, (8a) and (8b) have the same
truth conditions, that is, they are true just in case either Zhangsan knows that Lisi
likes pragmatics or Zhangsan knows that Lisi doesn’t like pragmatics. Neither the
matrix subject Zhangsan nor the speaker considers it more likely that Lisi likes
pragmatics. This suggests that the at-issue content of V-neg-V questions and shi-
bu-shi questions are the same, namely, the bipolar set {λw . p(w),λw .¬p(w)}.
This paper argues that shi-bu-shi questions differ from V-neg-V questions in
not-at-issue content, and it is the presupposition of the focus marker shi that acts as
the source of bias in shi-bu-shi questions. More specifically, I propose a threefold
analysis to derive the positive epistemic bias in shi-bu-shi questions:
i. Maximality presupposition: the focus marker shi presupposes that its pre-
jacent is a possible complete answer to the current Question Under Discus-
sion (QUD).
3 I will return to this issue in Section 5.1.
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ii. Strategies of inquiry: according to the maximality presupposition, shi-bu-
shi questions are presupposed to be part of the Focus-strategy of inquiry.
iii. Completeness-to-likelihood reasoning: the Focus-strategy of inquiry in-
dicates the questioner’s intention to close the current QUD, and to achieve
this goal, the questioner should check the answer that she considers most
likely to be true.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 focuses on shi-
declaratives and shows that the focus marker shi carries the maximality presuppo-
sition proposed by Velleman, Beaver, Destruel, Bumford, Onea & Coppock (2012).
Section 3 points out that both focus and contrastive topic in polar questions indi-
cate a strategy of inquiry, and shi-bu-shi questions are presupposed to be part of the
Focus-strategy of inquiry. Section 4 proposes the completeness-to-likelihood rea-
soning, thereby forging a novel link between focus in polar questions and question
bias. Section 5 discusses bias in embedded A-not-A questions and evidential bias.
2 Maximality presupposition
Before discussing the maximality presupposition, let me first clarify what is referred
to as the focus marker shi and how it is distinguished from the copula shi and the
stressed shi.
The focus marker shi can appear in sentence-initial or preverbal positions. The
sentence-initial shi, as in (9a), only associates with the subject focus or the entire
clause to its right, whereas the preverbal shi can freely associate with a focused
constituent within its scope. The focused constituent is prosodically determined.4
For instance, (9b) has a narrow focus on the object, signaled by the main stress, and
it can be used to answer the question ‘which branches of linguistics does Lisi like?’.
If nothing is particularly stressed, the whole constituent in the scope of shi, in this
case the VP, is interpreted as a focus. The sentence then can address questions like
‘what happens to Lisi?’ and ‘why is Lisi borrowing books on pragmatics?’.5
Declaratives with the focus marker shi are exhaustive, shown by (9a) and (9b).
The corresponding A-not-A questions, as in (9c), are the biased shi-bu-shi questions
discussed in Section 1.

















‘It is Lisi that likes pragmatics. (#Zhangsan also likes pragmatics.)’
4 In this sense, shi simply marks the scope of focus.




























‘Is it pragmatics that Lisi likes?’ POSITIVE BIAS
The copula shi is a verb taking a noun phrase as its complement. Copular sen-
tences are non-exhaustive, as (10a) illustrates. A-not-A questions formed with the
copula shi are neutral V-neg-V questions. For instance, (10b) is felicitous in a neu-
tral context where the questioner is looking for pragmaticists and knows nothing
about Lisi.
It seems that (10b) can also be used in a biased context where the questioner
suspects that Lisi is a pragmaticist. I argue that such biased A-not-A questions,
however, are in fact formed with the focus marker shi, and the copula shi is deleted
in PF by haplology, as (10c) illustrates. This is demonstrated by (10d) — when
adverbs intervene, the copula shi does not immediately follow the focus marker shi,





















































‘Lisi is only/also a pragmaticist, right?’ POSITIVE BIAS
When the focus marker shi is stressed, the declaratives turn non-exhaustive and
receive a VERUM-like reading; compare (11a) with (9b). Stressed shi-bu-shi ques-
tions express a complex bias: the questioner holds the prior belief that the positive
answer is true, but there exists contradictory evidence in the current context, so the
questioner double-checks the prior belief. In addition, stressed shi-bu-shi questions
exhibit the cornering effect, i.e., they force the addressee to give an answer (cf.
Biezma 2009; Biezma & Rawlins 2012, 2017).
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‘Is it really pragmatics that Lisi likes or not?’ COMPLEX BIAS
It is the stress itself, not the stressed shi, that gives rise to the VERUM-like read-
ing of declaratives and the complex bias with the cornering effect in A-not-A ques-
tions. (12) shows the same pattern for stressed verbs. Stressed V-neg-V questions
also have the cornering effect, yet the bias is slightly different: both the positive
and the negative answer are supported by diverse contextual evidence and/or be-
liefs, and therefore the questioner asks the addressee to resolve the conversational

























‘Does Lisi really like pragmatics or not?’ COMPLEX BIAS
(11) seems to support Romero & Han’s (2004) VERUM approach to question
bias, as stressed shi-bu-shi questions behave analogously to high negative polar
questions in English with respect to bias. It is plausible to assume that the stress
introduces a VERUM-like operator. But to account for the absence of exhaustivity
in (11a), the VERUM-like operator must trivialize the presupposition of the focus
marker shi in some way. I leave the full analysis of (11) and (12) for a later occasion.
In a nutshell, the focus marker shi differs from the copula shi and the stressed
shi in exhaustivity and question bias, as outlined in the table below.
Exhaustivity in declaratives Bias in A-not-A questions
Focus marker shi exhaustive positive epistemic bias
Copula shi non-exhaustive neutral
Stressed shi non-exhaustive complex bias & cornering effect
Now let us concentrate on the focus marker shi. As shown by (13) and (14),











‘It is pragmatics that Lisi likes.’
⇝ There exists a branch of linguistics that Lisi likes. EXISTENTIAL
⇝ Lisi does not like other branches. EXHAUSTIVE









‘It is not pragmatics that Lisi likes.’
⇝ There exists a branch of linguistics that Lisi likes. EXISTENTIAL
⇝ Lisi likes other branches. NON-EXHAUSTIVE
⇝ Someone thought that Lisi might like pragmatics. CONTRASTIVE
The existential inference is presuppositional, for it is backgrounded and can be
inherited by negative sentences (and polar questions). The exhaustive inference
does not survive under negation, but as we have seen in (9), it is not easily can-
cellable. The contrastive inference is backgrounded, and varies with the polarity of
the sentence.6 To provide a unified analysis of these inferences, I adopt the maxi-
mality presupposition by Velleman et al. (2012) and propose that the focus marker
shi presupposes that its prejacent is a possible strongest/complete answers to the
current QUD.7
(15) a. MAXS(p) = λw .∀q ∈ CQS [(q >S p)→¬q(w)]
b. JSHIKS = λ p .λw : MAXS(p)(w) . p(w)
c. JBU-SHIKS = ¬JSHIKS = λ p .λw : MAXS(p)(w) .¬p(w)
In words: SHI(p) and BU-SHI(p) presuppose that among the possible an-
swers to the current QUD in the context S (CQS), no true answer is strictly
stronger than p.
6 For the contrastive inference in it-clefts, see Destruel & Velleman (2014); Destruel, Beaver & Cop-
pock (2018).
7 I do not adopt the full cleft semantics by Velleman et al. (2012). They propose another focus-
sensitive operator MINS(p) for the at-issue content of it-clefts, which requires that there be a true
answer at least as strong as the prejacent p:
(i) MINS(p) = λw .∃q ∈ CQS [q(w)∧ (q ≥S p)]
(ii) CLEFTS = λ p .λw : MAXS(p)(w) .MINS(p)(w)
For their discussions on it-clefts, replacing MINS(p) with p causes no change. As for shi-
declaratives, the ‘at least’ inference is not independently attested (cf. Coppock & Beaver 2011,
2014). Furthermore, as evidenced by (8), shi-bu-shi questions and V-neg-V questions share the
same at-issue content, so the focus marker shi only contributes to the not-at-issue content.
Erlewine (2020) proposes that the semantics of shi is CLEFT. As I have argued, however, the
MIN component is not empirically motivated for shi, and makes incorrect predictions for (8).
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p∧q∧ r
p∧q p∧ r q∧ r
p q r
Figure 1 Stronger answers to the current QUD eliminated by MAXS(p)
The current QUD is the salient question in the context, which can be modeled
as a set of Rooth-Hamblin alternatives (Roberts 1996/2012; Beaver & Clark 2008).
Focus in assertions indicates the QUD, as assertions are presupposed to be congru-
ent to the QUD, that is, the focus alternative set of an assertion is required to be
identical to the QUD set (Roberts 1996/2012). Assuming that the alternatives in
the QUD set, i.e., the possible answers to the QUD, are partially ordered by entail-
ment, the maximality presupposition MAXS(p) restricts the QUD set by eliminating
possible answers that both entail and are distinct from p, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Consider the shi-declaratives in (13) and (14), repeated as (16). The object focus
activates alternatives such as ‘Lisi likes syntax’ and ‘Lisi likes semantics’, thereby
indicating the QUD ‘which branches of linguistics does Lisi like?’ represented
by (16c). Since the maximality presupposition of shi makes reference to the QUD,
(16a) and (16b) can be used only if the speaker and the addressee accept the question
in (16c) and their common conversational goal is to find the true answer (Roberts
1996/2012). The existential presupposition of shi-declaratives, then, comes from
the presupposed QUD which requires both the speaker and the addressee to believe
the existence of a true answer.8
(16) a. Lisi shi likes pragmaticsF .
b. Lisi bu-shi likes pragmaticsF .
c. CQS = {like(prag), like(syn), like(sem), like(syn⊕ sem),
like(prag⊕ syn), like(prag⊕ sem), like(prag⊕ syn⊕ sem), . . .}
8 The existential presupposition of shi-declaratives is stronger than that of regular wh-questions. Dayal
(2016: 51–52) suggests that the distinction between the soft existential presupposition of regular
wh-questions and the hard existential presupposition of clefted wh-questions lies in whether the
addressee is presupposed to believe the existence of a true answer:
(i) Who left? (Presupposition: the speaker believes that someone left.)




The maximality presupposition of shi eliminates stronger alternatives in the
QUD set, which leads to the polarity asymmetry with respect to exhaustive in-
ference. Both (16a) and (16b) presuppose the QUD set in (16c), where stronger
alternatives like ‘Lisi likes pragmatics and syntax’ are ruled out. (16a) asserts that
Lisi likes pragmatics; if Lisi also liked another branch, e.g., syntax, the stronger
alternative ‘Lisi likes pragmatics and syntax’ would be true, contradicting the pre-
supposed QUD set in (16c). Hence, (16a) gives rise to the exhaustive inference
that Lisi does not like other branches. (16b) asserts that it is false that Lisi likes
pragmatics; nevertheless, in the QUD set there exist other alternatives that have
no entailment relationship with the prejacent, from which one can draw the non-
exhaustive inference that Lisi likes other branches.
Basically, the prejacent of shi is required to be a possible complete answer to the
QUD, which is mutually exclusive with other possible complete answers. The con-
trastive inference follows from the mutual exclusivity. If the prejacent is asserted
to be true, other possible complete answers are false. Thus, (16a) can be used to
exclude all other possibilities considered by the (potential) addressee. If the preja-
cent is asserted to be false as in (16b), the sentence excludes the possibility that the
prejacent is the true complete answer. This possibility was typically on the table
in the previous context, as required by the ‘discourse presupposition’ of negative
sentences (Givón 1978).
3 Strategies of inquiry
I analyze shi in shi-bu-shi questions as the same focus marker, so the maximality
presupposition projects out of shi-bu-shi questions. As illustrated in (17), shi-bu-shi
questions differ from V-neg-V questions only in the maximality presupposition.
(17) V-neg-V questions: {λw . p(w),λw .¬p(w)}
shi-bu-shi questions: {λw : MAXS(p)(w) . p(w), λw : MAXS(p)(w) .¬p(w)}
Given the maximality presupposition, shi-bu-shi questions are used to check
the truth of possible complete answers to the current QUD, which indicates a strat-
egy of inquiry, namely, a set of questions partially ordered by entailment (Roberts
1996/2012). Büring (2003) proposes that whereas focus in assertions generates a
set of propositions that cannot indicate a strategy, contrastive topic in assertions
generates a set of questions and thus indicates a strategy. However, polar questions
do not appear to receive full consideration. In the following, I will argue that both
focus and contrastive topic in polar questions indicate a strategy of inquiry, and
shi-bu-shi questions are presupposed to be part of the Focus-strategy of inquiry.
Suppose the current QUD in the context is ‘which branches of linguistics does
Lisi like?’. Its possible complete answers, as in (18a), are exhaustive and mutually
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exclusive, and therefore they are disjunctive alternatives. By contrast, the set of
possible partial answers in (18b) only includes atoms that are non-exhaustive and
can be conjoined.
(18) a. Complete answers: {Lisi only likes pragmatics,Lisi only likes syntax,
Lisi only likes pragmatics and syntax, . . .}
b. Partial answers: {Lisi likes pragmatics,Lisi likes syntax, . . .}
Correspondingly, there are two ways to find the true complete answer to the
QUD. The questioner can use a polar question as a subquestion to check the truth
of a possible complete answer. If the answer to the polar question is yes, the QUD
will be closed; if not, the questioner should move to the next subquestion.
The questioner can also use polar questions to check the truth of possible partial
answers. The QUD will not be closed until the questioner has gone through all the
subquestions. As a consequence, no matter whether the answer to a non-terminal
subquestion is yes or no, the questioner should move to the next subquestion.
Polar questions in the first strategy are accompanied by focus, while polar ques-
tions with contrastive topic are generally used in the second strategy. Thus, I dub
these two strategies the F(ocus)-strategy of inquiry and the C(ontrastive)T(opic)-
strategy of inquiry, respectively.
QUD Which branches of linguistics does Lisi like?
F-strategy of inquiry (Checking the truth of possible complete answers)
Subquestions Is it pragmaticsF that Lisi likes?
Answers Yes — close the QUD
No — move to the next subquestion
CT-strategy of inquiry (Checking the truth of possible partial answers)
Subquestions (How about pragmaticsCT ?) Does Lisi like pragmaticsCT ?
Answers Yes — move to the next subquestion
No — move to the next subquestion
I assume, following Kamali & Krifka (2020), that focus and contrastive topic
trigger disjunctive and conjunctive alternatives, respectively. Given the congruence
requirement, disjunctive and conjunctive alternatives to assertions correspond to
possible complete and partial answers to the QUD, and accordingly, disjunctive and
conjunctive alternatives to polar questions are subquestions of the QUD, checking
the truth of possible complete and partial answers (see also Ye 2020b). Thereby,
both focus and contrastive topic in polar questions indicate a strategy of inquiry.
The maximality presupposition of shi requires shi-bu-shi questions to be part
of the F-strategy. Consider for example (5), repeated here as (19a). Since the
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answer to the shi-bu-shi question is yes, the questioner gets the complete answer
that Lisi only likes pragmatics and the current QUD is closed. It is infelicitous for
the questioner to follow up with an inquiry about another alternative; such anti-
additivity is analogous to exhaustivity in shi-declaratives.
(19) Focus in assertions and polar questions
a. Q: You shi-bu-shi like pragmaticsF?
A: Yes, you are right.
#Q: Do you like syntax?
b. Lisi shi likes pragmaticsF . (#He also likes syntax.)
By contrast, V-neg-V questions can be used to form the CT-strategy.9 Con-
sider the V-neg-V question in (20a), repeated from (3). After receiving the pos-
itive answer, the questioner only learns that Lisi likes pragmatics, and therefore
can further inquire about other branches. In this sense, contrastive topics exhibit
anti-exhaustivity in polar questions as in declaratives.
(20) Contrastive topic in assertions and polar questions
a. Q: You like-not-like pragmaticsCT ?
A: Yes, I do.
Q: Do you like syntax?
b. Lisi likes pragmaticsCT . He also likes syntaxCT .
For the cases discussed above, (anti-)exhaustivity and (anti-)additivity follow
from completeness of answerhood. Since contrastive topics represent partial an-
swers to the QUD and shi requires its prejacent to be a complete answer, shi cannot
associate with a contrastive topic. This prediction is borne out by (21).10


























Intended: ‘As for LisiCT , is it heF that likes pragmatics?’
9 V-neg-V questions never occur in the F-strategy, which can be attributed to the pragmatic principle
Maximize Presupposition! (Heim 1991). Roughly speaking, since V-neg-V questions and shi-bu-shi
questions have the same at-issue content and differ only in the maximality presupposition, the use
of V-neg-V questions implicates that the maximality presupposition does not hold, that is, V-neg-V
questions are not used to check possible complete answers.
10 Thanks to Mitcho Erlewine for raising this issue. Here I take the particle ne as a contrastive topic
marker, following Constant (2014). See Liu (2017) for a similar test on Mandarin focus particles.
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The focus marker shi can co-occur with contrastive topics when there is no
association between them. For instance, (21) will be grammatical if shi associates
with the object focus, as in (22).


























‘As for LisiCT , is it pragmaticsF that he likes?’
In this case, ‘it is pragmatics that Lisi likes’ is a possible complete answer to
the question ‘as for Lisi, which branches of linguistics does he like?’, which itself
inquires about a partial answer to the big question ‘which branches of linguistics do
they like?’. The discourse tree is as follows (cf. Büring 2003):
(23) Which branches of linguistics do they like?
As for LisiCT , which branches does he like? As for ZhangsanCT , . . .
Is it pragmaticsF that he likes? Is it syntaxF that he likes?
4 From completeness to likelihood
In the previous section, we have seen that the F-strategy differs from the CT-strategy
in the completeness of answerhood and the informativity with respect to the QUD.
In the F-strategy, (i) polar questions are used as subquestions to check the truth of
possible complete answers; (ii) positive answers to the subquestions can close the
QUD. In the CT-strategy, (i) polar questions are used as subquestions to check the
truth of possible partial answers; (ii) the QUD will not be closed until the questioner
has gone through all the possible partial answers.
The hallmark of the F-strategy is that once the possible complete answer is true,
the QUD will be closed, which conforms to the notion of ‘inquiry terminating’ in
Velleman et al. (2012). Since the F-strategy is a faster strategy for closing the QUD,
I assume that the F-strategy indicates the questioner’s intention to close the QUD,




In the F-strategy, the possible complete answer checked by the topmost polar
question is the one that the questioner considers most likely to be true.
a. The questioner will not adopt the F-strategy unless she intends to close
the QUD.
b. If the questioner adopts the F-strategy and intends to close the QUD, she
expects a positive answer (i.e., p >expected ¬p), given that only positive
answers to the subquestions can close the QUD.
c. If the questioner expects a positive answer, she should check the possi-
ble complete answer that she considers most likely to be true (i.e., ∀q ∈
CQS [(q ̸= p)→ (p >likely q)]), rather than a random one.11
The positive epistemic bias in shi-bu-shi questions follows directly from the
completeness-to-likelihood reasoning. Since shi-bu-shi questions are presupposed
to be part of the F-strategy, the questioner expects a positive answer to close the
QUD, and the possible complete answer that she is checking is the one that she
considers most likely to be true.
Note that the completeness-to-likelihood reasoning hinges on the assumption in
(24a). (24b) follows from (24a) and the ‘inquiry terminating’ property of the F-
strategy. (24c) follows from (24b) and the mutual exclusivity of possible complete
answers. Given that the main conversational goal is to close the QUD (Roberts
1996/2012), it seems natural to assume that strategies of inquiry in general indi-
cate the questioner’s intention to close the QUD. For the F-strategy, there are two
possible contexts.
First, in a context where both the F-strategy and the CT-strategy are available,
the questioner will not choose the F-strategy unless she intends to close the QUD in
a faster way. If the questioner cannot or does not want to close the QUD in a faster
way, she will choose the CT-strategy. If the questioner has no intention of closing
the QUD at all, she can express her ignorance (‘I have no idea’) or indifference (‘I
don’t care’), and no strategy of inquiry will be adopted.
Second, when the F-strategy is the only strategy available in the context, the
speaker has two choices: try to close the QUD via the F-strategy, or refuse to take an
active part in the conversational game. For instance, in guessing games, a guesser
is often forced to adopt the F-strategy. A participant can remain silent or admit
her ignorance, but once she provides a possible complete answer, she is taken as
an active guesser, and the possible complete answer is taken as the one that she
considers most likely to be true.
11 Given the mutual exclusivity of possible complete answers, if the questioner expects one possible
complete answer to be true, she expects others to be false. Hence, no matter how the questioner
assesses the likelihood of each possible complete answer, there must be a unique winner.
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As for the CT-strategy, since the questioner must go through all the possible
partial answers to close the QUD, the possible partial answers need not be ranked,
and the questioner in principle can check the possible partial answers randomly. In
other words, I predict that polar questions with contrastive topic are typically used
in neutral contexts. This prediction is supported by (25).
(25) Scenario: The speaker is organizing a party and she is in charge of supplying
all the non-alcoholic beverages for teetotalers. The speaker is going through
a list of people that are invited. She has no previous belief or expectation
about their drinking habits.
A: Jane and Mary do not drink.
S: OK. What about John? Does he not drink (either)?
While Romero & Han (2004) provide this example to show that low negative
polar questions are not necessarily biased, it is worth pointing out here that the
negative polar question in (25) is used as a subquestion in the CT-strategy. To wit,
the QUD in this context is ‘who do not drink?’ and ‘John does not drink’ is a
possible partial answer.
I conclude that the F-strategy differs from the CT-strategy in the likelihood re-
lations between subquestions. In the F-strategy, (iii) the subquestions are ranked in
descending order of likelihood. In the CT-strategy, (iii) the subquestions need not
be ranked.
By assuming the completeness-to-likelihood reasoning, a novel link between
focus in polar questions and question bias is established. It can further capture the
context-dependence of bias in unmarked positive polar questions. For instance, bias
in ma-questions, the run-of-the-mill polar questions in Mandarin Chinese, is largely
context-dependent (Guo 2000). Consider the Q&A pairs below. The ma-question
is biased in (26), but neutral in (27), as evidenced by the dui-answer diagnosis (see
footnote 1). This contrast can be attributed to the presupposition of the preceding
wh-QUD. In (26), the singular which-question carries a uniqueness presupposition,
and the ma-question proffers a possible complete answer to the which-question,
thereby forming the F-strategy. By contrast, in (27), the plural which-question asks
for a plural answer, and the ma-question checks a possible partial answer. As a

















‘Which person did you meet? Did you meet LisiF?’
A: jian-le/dui
meet-ASP/right



















‘Which two people did you meet? Did you meet LisiCT ?’
A: jian-le/#dui
meet-ASP/#right
‘Yes, I did./#Yes, you are right.’
The completeness-to-likelihood reasoning predicts that polar questions in the
F-strategy convey a positive epistemic bias. However, ma-questions with the focus
marker shi can occur in neutral contexts, which seems to be a counterexample.12
For instance, in the following neutral context, ma-questions with the focus marker
shi and V-neg-V questions are felicitous, in contrast to shi-bu-shi questions.
(28) Neutral context: The teacher said that she lost one student’s homework.
Zhangsan does not know whose homework has been lost, but he is very



























‘#Was it my homework that was lost?’
Note that the questioner Zhangsan is not concerned about whose homework
was lost, but rather about whether his homework was lost. If the answer to the
polar question is no, Zhangsan’s worry will be removed and he will stop inquiring.
Put differently, in (28), no wh-QUD is presupposed and no strategy of inquiry is
involved. Hence, (28a) is not a genuine counterexample to the completeness-to-
likelihood reasoning.
Nevertheless, it is not obvious why the focus marker shi in ma-questions does
not necessarily presuppose the F-strategy. I would like to suggest that the contribu-
tion of the question particle ma is to add its prejacent to the top of the QUD stack.
The wh-QUD presupposed by shi can be either added to the QUD stack or sup-
pressed by ma. If the shi . . . ma question is itself the current QUD, the maximality
presupposition of shi is trivially satisfied, yet no strategy of inquiry is indicated.
12 Thanks to Jad Wehbe and Yu’an Yang for bringing this to my attention.
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5 Discussion
5.1 Bias in embedded questions
As mentioned in the introduction, the bias in shi-bu-shi questions seems concealed
when embedded by certain responsive predicates. For instance, the embedded shi-
bu-shi question in (29a), just like the embedded V-neg-V question in (29b), does not
give rise to any inference with respect to bias. Neither the matrix subject Zhangsan
nor the speaker considers it more likely that Lisi likes pragmatics.













‘Zhangsan knows whether it is pragmatics that Lisi likes.’











‘Zhangsan knows whether Lisi likes pragmatics.’
̸⇝ Zhangsan conjectures that Lisi may like pragmatics.
By contrast, when embedded by some rogative predicates, shi-bu-shi questions
convey a positive epistemic bias, yet the attitude holder is shifted to the matrix
subject. For instance, (30a) carries the inference that the matrix subject is biased
towards the positive answer to the embedded question, whereas (30b) does not.















‘They are talking about whether it is pragmatics that Lisi likes.’













‘They are talking about whether Lisi likes pragmatics.’
̸⇝ They conjecture that Lisi may like pragmatics.
Intuitively, the contrast between (29a) and (30a) can be attributed to the role
of the matrix subject. The subjects of responsive predicates canonically take the
role of answerer, whereas the subjects of some rogative predicates take the role of
questioner. According to the completeness-to-likelihood reasoning, the bias in shi-
bu-shi questions stems from the questioner’s intention and expectation, while the
answerer’s epistemic state is irrelevant. Thus, embedded bias can be observed with




As demonstrated by (4) and (5) in the introductory section, shi-bu-shi questions
are not sensitive to the distinction between evidential and epistemic bias (see also
footnote 2). Consider now the following biased context adapted from Sudo (2013):
(31) Biased context: Zhangsan and Lisi work in a windowless room. When Lisi






In the classical view, (31) illustrates a context with positive evidential bias, and
the question bias is directly connected to the contextual evidence, i.e., the com-
pelling contextual evidence supports or contextually entails the positive answer
(Büring & Gunlogson 2000; Gunlogson 2003; Reese 2007; Sudo 2013; a.o.). Given
my proposal for shi-bu-shi questions, there seems to be an alternative way of deriv-
ing question bias from the contextual evidence:
i. The contextual evidence q can raise an implicit (potential) question Q (e.g.,
‘why q?’), in the sense of Onea (2016).
ii. To ask a polar question ‘p?’ in the context with the evidence q, is typically
to check the possible complete answer p to the implicit question Q.
iii. By the completeness-to-likelihood reasoning, ‘p?’ is biased towards p.
Take (31) for illustration. When noticing Lisi’s wet jacket, Zhangsan may won-
der why. In this sense, the contextual evidence raises an implicit question ‘why is
Lisi’s jacket wet?’. By asking ‘is it raining?’, Zhangsan wants to check with Lisi
whether the possible complete answer ‘it is raining’ is true. In accordance with the
completeness-to-likelihood reasoning, the questioner expects the positive answer.
Note that in the second step, there is no guarantee that the polar question will be
used to check the possible complete answer. To remedy this, I assume that implicit
(potential) questions like why-questions by default carry a uniqueness presupposi-
tion. Further investigation is needed to confirm this assumption.
While the QUD view of contextual evidence blurs the distinction between ev-
idential and epistemic bias in certain cases, it captures the QUD requirement of
shi-bu-shi questions and helps us understand why such questions are insensitive to
the EVI–EPI distinction. Moreover, it provides another perspective on how con-
textual evidence and question bias are related. The contextual evidence may not
contextually entail or imply the positive answer directly, but rather introduces a set
of alternatives including the positive answer.
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